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NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS ON SUBSEQUENT DISCRETIONARY
APPELLATE REVIEW: DUE PROCESS OR
UNEQUAL PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court decided Powell v. Alabama1 in 1932, the
extent to which the fourteenth amendment obligates a state to provide
free counsel to indigent criminal defendants has been the source of con-
siderable controversy. A state is now obliged to provide free counsel
for indigent criminal defendants: (1) at a post-indictment lineup ;2 (2) at
a preliminary hearing to determine the existence of probable cause;3 (3)
during custodial interrogation ;4 (4) at a pre-trial arraignment where cer-
tain defenses must be pleaded or lost;5 (5) upon the entering of a guilty
plea at any time;6 (6) at trial;7 (7) at sentencing;8 and, (8) on initial
appeals as of right.9 In Ross v. Moffitt,'0 the United States Supreme
Court held that the fourteenth amendment does not compel a state to
provide free counsel to aid indigent criminal defendants in preparing peti-
tions either for discretionary review in state courts or for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. Ross, therefore, delineates what might be
termed the "upper limit" of the right to counsel. This note will analyze
the Court's reasoning in Ross in light of its other decisions concerning
the rights of indigent criminal defendants" and will suggest that only
the due process clause,12 rather than the equal protection clause,' 3 of the
1. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972), which held that there is no right to counsel at a pre-indictment lineup, and
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), which held that there is no right to
counsel at a photographic identification.
3. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
6. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
7. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963).
8. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736
(1948).
9. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, rehearing denied, 373 U.S. 905 (1963).
10. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
11. Particularly Douglas v. California, supra note 9, which held that indigent
criminal defendants were denied due process and the equal protection of the laws
when the merits of their first appeal as of right were decided without their having the
benefit of counsel.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Id. The Court relied primarily upon an equal protection analysis in deciding
both Douglas and Ross.
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fourteenth amendment can determine the extent to which a state must
compensate for the indigency of criminal defendants.
In Ross, respondent had been convicted in Mecklenburg and Guilford
Counties in North Carolina, on separate charges of forgery and uttering
a forged instrument. At his trials, and on his separate appeals as of right
to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, respondent was represented by
court-appointed counsel. Following affirmance 14 of his Mecklenburg
County conviction, respondent sought to invoke the discretionary review
procedures of the North Carolina Supreme Court. His court-appointed
counsel approached the Mecklenburg County Superior Court about possi-
ble appointment to represent respondent on this appeal, but counsel was
informed that the State was not required to furnish counsel to petition for
such review. Following affirmance 15 of his Guilford County conviction,
respondent also sought the discretionary review of the North Carolina
Supreme Court. On seeking this review, however, respondent was not
denied counsel, but rather was represented by the public defender who
represented him at trial. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however,
denied certiorari. 16 Respondent then unsuccessfully petitioned the Superior
Court for Guilford County for court-appointed counsel to prepare a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
Respondent also sought post-conviction relief throughout the state courts.
After exhausting state remedies, respondent sought federal habeas corpus
relief in the United States District Courts for the Middle and Western
Districts of North Carolina. Those courts denied relief,17 and respondent
took an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The court of appeals reversed the two district court decisions, holding
that respondent was entitled to the assistance of counsel at state expense
both on his petition to the North Carolina Supreme Court and on his peti-
tion to the United States Supreme Court.'8 The court of appeals noted
that in Douglas v. California'9 the United States Supreme Court held that
an indigent, convicted of a felony, was entitled to the assistance of assigned
counsel in presenting his appeal to the state's intermediate appellate court.
Although Douglas was specifically limited to "the one and only appeal an
indigent has as of right,"20 the court of appeals stated: "On principle,
however, we can find no logical basis for differentiation between appeals
as of right and permissive review procedures in the context of the Consti-
tution and the right to counsel."'1
14. State v. Moffitt, 9 N.C. App. 694, 177 S.E.2d 324 (1970).
15. State v. Moffitt, 11 N.C. App. 337, 181 S.E.2d 184 (1971).
16. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971).
17. Moffitt v. Blackledge, 341 F. Supp. 853 (W.D.N.C. 1972). The Middle Dis-
trict case is unreported.
18. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973).
19. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
20. Id. at 357.
21. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d at 653.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari22 to consider
the court of appeals' decision in light of the apparently contrary decisions
of the courts of appeals for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits23 and the
Court's own reasoning in Douglas. The Court resolved the apparent con-
flict by reversing the court of appeals and holding that a state is not con-
stitutionally compelled to furnish free counsel to indigent criminal de-
fendants for discretionary review in state courts or for preparation of a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
THE Ross ANALYSIS
The Court began its analysis in Ross by reviewing the law on in-
digents' rights on appeal. It cited the transcript cases2 4 for the proposition
that "a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while
leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons. '25 The Court
then examined 26 its holding in Douglas, that a state does not fulfill its
responsibility to an indigent criminal defendant merely by providing him
with a free transcript, but must go further and provide counsel for the
indigent on his first appeal of right. The Court pointed out that this hold-
ing was specifically limited to an indigent's first appeal of right 27 and that
a state can, without violating the fourteenth amendment, provide for
differences in appellate procedure so long as the result does not amount
to a denial of due process or an invidious discrimination.28
The Court structured its opinion in an attempt to remedy a funda-
mental ambiguity in prior cases:
The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases
has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some
from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment. 29
22. 414 U.S. 1128 (1974).
23. Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969), held that Illinois had
fully discharged its constitutional obligation by providing assigned counsel for an
indigent's appeal of right to an intermediate appellate court and was not required
to provide counsel to assist the indigent as he sought access to the Supreme Court
of Illinois. Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1965), held that New Mexico had
no obligation to provide an indigent with the assistance of counsel to prepare andfile in the Supreme Court of the United States a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court of New Mexico.
24. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477(1963) ; and, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In each of these cases the Court
held that a transcript, being necessary for adequate appellate review, cannot be required
in a manner which disadvantages criminal defendants on account of their poverty.
25. 417 U.S. at 607.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 608.
28. 372 U.S. at 356-57.
29. 417 U.S. at 608-09.
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In a laudable effort to be more precise, the Court in Ross addressed the
issues of due process and equal protection separately and thus provided a
valuable insight into the conceptual differences between these two clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.A0
The Court's due process holding was quite succinct: "We do not
believe that the Due Process Clause requires North Carolina to provide
respondent with counsel on his discretionary appeal to the State Supreme
Court."3 1 Citing Gideon v. Wainwright,32 the Court stated that the right
to counsel at trial is fundamental and binding upon the states by virtue of
the sixth and fourteenth amendments. The Court then distinguished Ross
from Gideon by noting that at trial the defendant is being haled into
court and hence uses counsel as a shield, while on appeal the defendant
initiates the process and uses counsel rather as a sword.33  The Court
further distinguished Gideon arguing that, while a state cannot simply
dispense with the trial stage of criminal proceedings, it need not provide
any appeal at all.34 If a state does provide an appeal, it does not neces-
sarily act unfairly by refusing to provide counsel to indigents at every
step along the way. Unfairness results only if indigents are singled out
by the state and denied meaningful access to that system because of their
poverty.33 This problem, the Court determined, is better handled under
the rubric of equal protection.
In its equal protection analysis, the Court once again confronted its
holding in Douglas:
[W]here the merits on the one and only appeal an indigent has as of
right are decided without the benefit of counsel, we think an uncon-
stitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.3 6
Therefore, in order to reconcile its holding in Ross with that in Douglas,
the Court must show why an "unconstitutional line has been drawn be-
30. "'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual
dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may
be treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment
by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguish-
able. We will address these issues separately in the succeeding sections." Id. at 609.
31. Id. at 610.
32. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33. This distinction would have more merit had the Court not previously decided
in Douglas that an indigent criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel
on his first appeal of right. It would seem that on his first appeal of right the in-
digent defendant is using counsel as a sword as much as on subsequent appeals.
Therefore, if this sword-shield distinction is crucial, why then was it not con-
trolling in Douglas, which seems indistinguishable from Ross in this respect?
34. 417 U.S. at 611, citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
35. It is important to note that the Court speaks not only of access to the appel-
late system, but of meaningful access to that system.
36. 417 U.S. at 611, quoting Douglas, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (emphasis
in original).
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tween rich and poor"3 7 in denying counsel on first appeal while such a
line has not been drawn in denying counsel for subsequent appeals. The
Court stated that the fourteenth amendment "does not require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages," 38 nor does it require a state to
"equalize economic conditions." 39 The equal protection clause requires
only that the state appellate system be "free from unreasonable distinc-
tions."'40  Therefore, if a reasonable distinction can be made between
indigent criminal defendants on first appeal and the same indigent criminal
defendants on subsequent appeals, then a state may be justified in provid-
ing counsel to one and not to the other. The Court then analyzed the
North Carolina appellate system and concluded that a rational basis does
exist for the distinction.
To support this conclusion, the Court stressed two factors: (1) the
amount of information available to a discretionary appellate court; and,
(2) the purpose of discretionary appellate review. In preparing for his
first appeal of right, the indigent defendant, if denied counsel, would have
at most a bare trial transcript, which might or might not adequately
demonstrate an error below, and any sort of pro se brief that he might
have the limited knowledge to prepare. With only this information, the
appellate court would have difficulty locating errors below; hence the
advice of counsel is desperately needed at this stage. When preparing for
discretionary appellate review, however, the indigent criminal defendant
has many more resources:
At that stage he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other
record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of
Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an
opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These ma-
terials, supplemented 'by whatever submission respondent may make
pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review. 41
The Court next considered the function of discretionary appellate
review in the North Carolina Supreme Court 42 and noted that certiorari
may be denied even though the court believes the decision of the court
37. 372 U.S. at 357.
38. 417 U.S. at 612, quoting San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
39. 417 U.S. at 612, quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956).
40. 417 U.S. at 612, quoting Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
41. 417 U.S. at 615.
42. The Court stated:
The critical issue in that court, as we perceive it, is not whether there has been
"a correct adjudication of guilt" in every individual case . . .but rather whether
"the subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest," whether "the
cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the
state," or whether the decision below is in probable conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court.
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of appeals to be incorrect, 43 since a decision which appears incorrect may
nevertheless fail to satisfy any of the other criteria for granting certiorari.44
The Court then noted that once a defendant's claims of error are presented
in a lawyer-like fashion to the court of appeals, the North Carolina Supreme
Court would have an adequate basis for ascertaining whether the case
satisfies the standards of review established by the legislature.4 5 The
Court noted that although the indigent criminal defendant without counsel
is somewhat handicapped when compared to the defendant who can afford
counsel, the materials available to the reviewing court and the nature
of the discretionary review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina
"make this relative handicap far less than the handicap borne by the in-
digent defendant denied counsel on his initial appeal as of right in
Douglas.' '4 6 Thus the Court concluded that North Carolina is not re-
quired by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to pro-
vide counsel to indigent criminal defendants for discretionary appellate
review in the state courts.
The Court finally considered North Carolina's denial of counsel for
preparation of a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
First, the Court noted that much of the discussion concerning an indigent's
right to counsel in seeking discretionary state appellate review is applicable
to the question of whether a state must provide counsel to an indigent
criminal defendant seeking review by the United States Supreme Court.
In determining whether or not to grant certiorari the United States
43. Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E2d
133 (1973).
44. 417 U.S. at 615. The Court also stated:
The choice of cases to be reviewed is not left entirely within the discretion of
the Supreme Court but is regulated by statutory standards. Subsection (c) of
this [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31] provision states:
"In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, cer-
tification may be made by the Supreme Court after determination of the
cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the Supreme Court (1)
The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or (2) The
cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of
the State, or (3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be
in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court."
Id. at 613-14.
45. This argument loses much of its force, however, when applied to a jurisdic-
tion in which the accuracy of the decision below is a major criterion for determin-
ing reviewability.
In Maryland the Court of Appeals may grant certiorari whenever it finds
"that review of the case . . . is desirable and in the public interest. . . ." MD. ANN.
CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-203 (1974). It may well be argued that reversing
a wrong decision, especially in a serious charge where a heavy sentence has been
imposed, is "desirable and in the public interest" and therefore that certiorari should
be granted. Thus Maryland may be a jurisdiction where accuracy of the decision
below is a major criterion the Court of Appeals considers in deciding whether or not
to grant certiorari.
46. 417 U.S. at 616.
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Supreme Court would have the same transcript, appellate brief, and
opinion before it that a state appellate court would have on discretionary
review. Also, its review, much like that of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, depends upon a number of factors other than the accuracy of
the decision below. The Court finally noted that the source of the right
to Supreme Court review is of federal rather than state origin, thereby
rendering the Griffin and Douglas arguments inapplicable. 47 The Court
acknowledged that it might be logical under the rationale of Griffin and
Douglas to require that the federal government or the Court provide coun-
sel to indigents seeking certiorari, but stated that this has not been done. 48
The Court concluded by stating that it did not seek to discourage
states from making counsel available at all stages of judicial review, but
that its reading of the fourteenth amendment leaves this choice up to the
individual states.49 Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit was reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas based his dissent5" upon the analysis of Chief
Judge Haynsworth writing for a unanimous court below.5 ' He noted the
Court's holding in Douglas and stated that he, like Chief Judge Hayns-
worth, "could find 'no logical basis for differentiation between appeals of
right and permissive review procedures in the context of the Constitution
and the right to counsel.' "52 The dissent agreed with Chief Judge Hayns-
worth that the "indigent defendant proceeding without counsel is at a
substantial disadvantage relative to wealthy defendants represented by
counsel when he is forced to fend for himself in seeking discretionary
47. There is also a significant difference between the source of the right to
seek discretionary review in the Supreme Court of North Carolina and the source
of the right to seek discretionary review in this Court. The former is conferred
by the statutes of the State of North Carolina, but the latter is granted by statute
enacted by Congress. Thus the arguments relied upon in the Griffin and Douglas
cases, that the State having once created a right of appeal must give all persons
an equal opportunity to enjoy the right, is by its terms inapplicable. The right to
seek certiorari in this Court is not granted by any State, and exists by virtue of
federal statute with or without the consent of the State whose judgment is
sought to be reviewed.
Id. at 417.
48. Id. See, e.g., Drumm v. California, 373 U.S. 947 (1963); Mooney v. New
York, 373 U.S. 947 (1963); Oppenheimer v. California, 374 U.S. 819 (1963). It is
the present practice of the Supreme Court not to provide counsel for the preparation
of petitions for certiorari, but to do so if certiorari is granted.
49. Maryland, by statute, currently provides for representation by the public
defender or by an attorney appointed by the public defender in "all stages of the
proceedings, including custody, interrogation, preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial,
and appeal, if any, and shall continue until the final disposition of the cause, or until
the assigned attorney is relieved by the Public Defender or by order of the court in
which the cause is pending." Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 4(d) (Gum. Supp. 1974).
See also MD. R. CiV. P. 719(d).
50. Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concurred in the dissent.
51. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973).
52. 417 U.S. at 619.
COUNSEL FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
review from the State Supreme Court or from this Court. ' 5 3 The opinion
also noted that it would be a relatively easy matter for the attorney who
handled the first appeal to assist the indigent in filing a petition for dis-
cretionary review to a higher court.54 Thus the dissent argued on con-
stitutional as well as practical grounds that a state should be required to
furnish counsel for indigent criminal defendants seeking discretionary
appellate review.
EQUAL PROTECTION INCONSISTENCIES
The Court sought to distinguish Ross from Douglas by noting the
differences between a first appeal of right and subsequent discretionary
appeals. This distinction, when viewed in light of other equal protection
decisions, presents certain analytical difficulties. In Douglas, the Court
based its holding upon the foundation laid by Griffin.55
In Griffin v. Illinois [citations omitted] we held that a State may not
grant appellate review in such a way as to discriminate against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty. There . . . the
right to a free transcript on appeal was in issue. Here the issue is
whether or not an indigent shall be denied the assistance of counsel
on appeal. In either case the evil is the same: discrimination against
the indigent.56
The holding in Griffin, like the holding in Douglas, was based primarily
upon the equal protection clause. "For there can be no equal justice
where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends upon the amount of
money he has.' ,5
The holding in Douglas could more rationally be limited to first
appeals of right if Griffin had also been so limited.5 8 However, in Burns
v. Ohio,5 9 the Court specifically refused to limit the Griffin rationale to
first appeals of right:
Although the State admits that petitioner 'in truth and in fact'
is a pauper, it presses several arguments which it claims distinguish
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, and justify the Ohio practice. First,
the State argues that petitioner received one appellate review of his
conviction in Ohio, while in Griffin, Illinois had left the defendant
53. Id. at 620.
54. Id. at 621.
55. The Court in Griffin held that equal protection required that "[dlestitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts." 351 U.S. at 19.
56. 372 U.S. at 355.
57. Id.
58. See Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 12 (1963).
59. 360 U.S. 252 (1958). Although Burns dealt specifically with the constitu-
tionality of a filing fee, the Court's logic in refusing to limit the Griffin rationale
to initial appeals seems to apply with equal force to transcripts.
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without any judicial review of his conviction. This is a distinction
without a difference for, as Griffin holds, once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose in-
digents from access to any phase of that procedure because of their
poverty. 351 U.S. at 18, 22. This principle is no less applicable where
the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the
second phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.60
A literal reading of Burns and Griffin might lead to the conclusion
that the fourteenth amendment compels the state to provide only equal
access to appellate review - that it does not speak to the quality of that
review.6 1 However, the Court in Douglas seemed to reject the access-
only interpretation when it stated: "In either case [denial of a free tran-
script on appeal or denial of free counsel on appeal] the evil is the same:
discrimination against the indigent." 62 Therefore, if a state is required to
afford some quality of appellate review and not merely equal access to the
appellate system, the question arises: why is a classification between rich
and poor which affects the quality of appellate review unconstitutional
when applied to a first appeal, but constitutional when applied to subse-
quent appeals?
The Court in Ross attempted to justify the transformation based upon
the distinction between first appeal and subsequent discretionary appeals- 3
However, it is easily arguable that the differences between first appeals
and subsequent discretionary appeals are not so great that a distinction
between rich and poor which is unconstitutional in the former can be con-
stitutional in the latter. For the indigent criminal defendant, first appeals
and subsequent appeals are ultimately identical: either can reverse his con-
viction and set him free. As Chief Judge Haynsworth noted: "the state's
highest court remains the ultimate arbiter of the rights of its citizens." '64
Since only the state's highest court can authoritatively make law, denial
of counsel to indigents for discretionary appeals may leave the develop-
ment of the law entirely within the hands of those who can afford counsel.
Finally, "the technical requirements for applications for writs of certiorari
are hazards which one untrained in the law could hardly be expected to
negotiate." 65 Thus the distinctions between first appeal and subsequent
discretionary appeals are not so great that counsel, necessary for meaning-
ful appellate review in the former, may be dispensed with without any
great harm to the indigent in the latter.
60. Id. at 257. See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1963).
61. See Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 13 (1963).
62. 372 U.S. at 355.
63. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
64. 483 F.2d at 653.
65. Id.
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The argument, then, is that Ross is inconsistent with the Court's prior
equal protection holdings. Griffin and Burns hold that the equal protec-
tion clause compels the states to afford the indigent criminal defendant
equal access to its appellate process - with no distinction between first
appeals of right and subsequent discretionary appeals. Douglas holds that
access is not enough: the states must provide for meaningful appellate
review, and appointed counsel is necessary to achieve it. The distinction
which the Ross Court draws between first appeals of right and subsequent
discretionary appeals is insufficient to support the proposition that mean-
ingful review can occur without counsel in the latter but not in the former.
A MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM
The point of the argument in the preceding section is not that the
Court reached the wrong result in Ross. The argument seeks to show
only that the equal protection analysis when applied in the area of right
to counsel for indigents, has led the Court into an inconsistent position.
Furthermore, the Court's application of equal protection in these cases
involves a more fundamental difficulty. In Griffin the Court held that the
refusal of the state to furnish an indigent criminal defendant with a free
trial transcript where such a transcript was virtually required for appel-
late review deprived him of equal protection of the law. It is important
to note that Illinois did not deny anyone a transcript solely because of in-
digency. "The state simply ignored private inequalities of wealth and
offered the transcript to everyone on numerically equal terms, that is, at
a price which approximated the cost of preparing it. ' 66 Thus the effect
of the decision in Griffin was to require, under the guise of equal protec-
tion, that the states take affirmative action to remove economic barriers
not of their own creation. Realizing that this was a severe departure from
traditional notions of equal protection. Mr. Justice Harlan protested in
dissent.6 7 Indeed, he dissented from the use of equal protection in a few
similar cases, 68 including Douglas, which based the right to counsel on
66. Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rv. 1065, 1178
(1969).
67. The Court thus holds that, at least in this area of criminal appeals, the
Equal Protection Clause imposes on the States an affirmative duty to lift the
handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances. That holding
produces the anomalous result that a constitutional admonition to the States to
treat all persons equally means in this instance that Illinois must give to some
what it requires others to pay for . . . . It may as accurately be said that the
real issue in this case is not whether Illinois has discriminated but whether it
has a duty to discriminate.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34-35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
68. E.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487 (1963). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for the Court, used the due process clause, rather than the equal protection
clause, to evaluate Connecticut's fee requirement for commencement of a divorce
action. The Court held the fee unconstitutional when applied to indigent petitioners.
1975]
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appeal primarily upon equal protection grounds. 69 In that dissent, Mr.
Justice Harlan stated:
Laws such as these do not deny equal protection to the less fortu-
nate for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not
impose on the States an 'affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing
from different economic circumstances.t °
The central point for Mr. Justice Harlan was that the equal protec-
tion clause requires the states, absent a rational basis for classification,
to treat its citizens equally. However, this requirement of equal treatment
does not forbid laws which, while treating all equally, have greater impact
on some because of their poverty:
But it is a far different thing to suggest that this provision (the Equal
Protection Clause) prevents the State from adopting a law of general
applicability than may affect the poor more harshly than it does
the rich .... 71
A reading of the equal protection clause which forbids uniform provisions
which have a more severe impact on the poor would preclude the possi-
bility of any uniform fine or tax.72 A parking fine of twenty dollars, for
example, has a significantly greater impact on a poor person than on a
rich one, but surely the equal protection clause is not offended. The im-
possibility of a uniform fine or tax under the Court's "impact" theory of
equal protection should be taken as a reductio ad absurdum of that position.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was designed
to protect individuals from arbitrary and irrational discriminations on the
part of the states. It cannot, however, be used to require the states to
take affirmative action to lift the handicaps flowing from varying economic
circumstances not of the state's own making.
69. "In my view the Equal Protection Clause is not apposite, and its application
to cases like the present one can lead only to mischievous results." Douglas, 372
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Perhaps one of the mischievous results to
which Mr. Justice Harlan was referring is that the logical consequences of basing an
indigent's rights upon this line of analysis is that a state may have to provide the
indigent with everything that his wealthy neighbor can afford.
70. 372 U.S. at 362.
71. Id. at 361.
72. Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is
more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take it that no
one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a uniform sales tax.
to charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the purchase of water from
a municipal corporation, to impose a standard fine for criminal violations, or to
establish minimum bail for various categories of offenses. Nor could it be con-
tended that the State may not classify as crimes acts which the poor are more
likely to commit than are the rich.
Id. at 361-62. To say that states are required to take affirmative action to equalize
economic disadvantages would, if carried to its logical end, completely cripple state
governmental operation. Certainly, this is not a result envisioned by the framers.
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A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Although the equal protection clause does not require states to take
affirmative action to remove handicaps resulting from economic inequality,
there are nevertheless situations where it would be a denial of due process
to allow such handicaps to remain.7 3 It is upon the protections afforded
by the due process clause that the rights of indigent criminal defendants
in all areas must be based. The due process clause was designed to assure
every individual a certain amount of decency and fair treatment from his
government. Thus a due process inquiry would focus on whether or not
an indigent criminal defendant is getting all that he is due from the state,
and not on whether or not he is getting everything that his rich neighbor
can afford.
This approach was taken by the Supreme Court in Gideon.74 In
Gideon, decided the same year as Douglas, the Court held that the right
to counsel in a criminal trial was fundamental and that the states were
required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to provide
free counsel to indigent criminal defendants at that stage.
An initial hurdle to the extension of this analysis into the area of
criminal appeals is McKane v. Durston,75 which was decided by the
Supreme Court in 1894. In McKane, the Court said that due process
does not require a state to provide any appellate review at all. The Ross
Court used McKane to distinguish between trial, where due process re-
quires the assistance of counsel, and appeal, where it heretofore has not:
This difference [between trial and appeal] is significant for, while no
one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial
stage of proceedings without a criminal defendant's consent, it is clear
that the State need not provide any appeal at all. 76
So long as McKane stands, the Gideon due process rationale cannot be
extended into the area of criminal appeals. It is difficult to contend that a
state can deny all appeal to an indigent defendant, but that if it grants
an appeal, due process requires the provision of counsel. The simple
solution is to overrule McKane as an eighty-year-old anachronism. Over-
ruling McKane would allow extension of the Gideon rationale into the
area of criminal appeals and eliminate the need to rely on equal protection.
Furthermore, there are certain independent reasons for overruling
McKane. In our complex criminal justice system fair procedure simply
is not exhausted at trial. The increasingly complex state of evidentiary,
73. If the resulting inequality is so unfair that to allow it to remain would be
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, then the state would be constrained by due
process to equalize the advantage at least to the point where such gross unfairness
no longer exists. In Douglas and Griffin, however, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that
the refusal of states to provide free counsel and transcripts to indigent criminal
defendants did not violate due process.
74. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
75. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
76. 417 U.S. at 611, citing McKane.
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constitutional and substantive aspects of criminal law, coupled with over-
crowded trial dockets, make the possibility of error at the trial stage far
greater than it was in 1894. It is submitted that a criminal defendant is
now due at least one review of his trial. The Court in Ross noted that "no
one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage
of proceedings without a criminal defendant's consent . . . . " In 1975
no state should be able to successfully contend that it can do away with its
appellate system in its entirety, thereby leaving life, liberty, and property
within the unfettered control of a single judge and jury.
Once McKane is overruled, the Gideon due process rationale can be
extended to criminal appeals, and Griffin, Douglas, Gideon, Burns and
Ross can all be logically reconciled. It can easily be contended that fair-
ness requires a state to provide an indigent with a free transcript or free
access to every stage of its appellate system. This, after all, costs the state
relatively little. However it might strain the notions of fairness and
decency to require a state to go further and provide free counsel to the
indigent at every step along the way. This is where the advantage of due
process over equal protection becomes apparent. One need not show that
indigents on first appeal and indigents on subsequent discretionary appeals
are so different that it is rational within the context of equal protection
to classify - and therefore treat - them differently. One merely needs to
show that while fairness requires counsel on first appeal it is not so un-
fair as to violate due process not to provide counsel on subsequent dis-
cretionary appeals. In this context the Court's arguments concerning the
additional information available to a subsequent reviewing court and the dis-
cretionary nature of such a court have more merit. These factors, coupled
with the fact that the indigent defendant has already had one appeal with
counsel, might reduce any unfairness resulting from a state's refusal to
supply counsel for subsequent discretionary appeals to the point where
due process is not offended. Thus, with McKane overruled, Gideon,
Douglas, Griffin, Burns and Ross could all be reconciled.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Ross v. Moffitt reached the rather pragmatic conclusion
that states are not required to provide free counsel to indigent criminal
defendants seeking subsequent discretionary appellate review. This con-
clusion is, however, arguably inconsistent with the Court's prior equal
protection holdings in Griffin, Burns, and Douglas. Furthermore, the
entire use of equal protection in the area of criminal appeals is inapposite
and can only lead to absurd or illogical conclusions. This note has at-
tempted to demonstrate that due process, rather than equal protection,
should determine the rights of indigent criminal defendants. Because fair-
ness is an inherently more flexible standard than equality, due process
would allow the Court to achieve a proper result without offending logic.
77. Id.
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